Showing posts with the label incentives

Incentive compatibility is not enough: evidence from the Israeli matching market for psychologists, by Hassidim, Romm and Shorrer

While it has taken some time for this paper to be published, I think it was the first to discover t…

Gaming organ allocation: Heart failure treatment responds to changes in the priority rules for heart transplants

Recent changes in the allocation of deceased donor hearts for transplantation have focused on what …

Can YouTube's recommender engine tone down conspiracy theories?

The NY Times has the story: Can YouTube Quiet Its Conspiracy Theorists? A new study examines YouTub…

Regulations gone awry -- an example from transplantation

A general lesson of market design is that participants have big strategy sets, so any given set of …

NYC school choice: long lines for high school tours (and some confusion about first choices)

The high school choice process in New York City uses an algorithm that makes it safe for families t…

Transplantation rates for patients in non-profit versus for-profit dialysis centers

From JAMA,September 10, 2019  Volume 322, Number 10: J::AMA September 10, 2019 Volume 322, Number …

Waitlists in NYC school choice--early reflections on yesterday's initial announcements

Yesterday the New York City Department of Education announced a change in the school choice assignm…

Large strategy sets: college financial aid, and automatic weapons

One of the big lessons of market design is that participants have big strategy sets, so that many k…

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