I'll be speaking today at UC Irvine, here's the announcement:
“Who Gets What? The New Economics of Matching and Market Design”
Date: Friday, June 7, 2019 at 1:30-2:30 p.m.
Location: UCI’s Calit2 Auditorium
Seating is on a first-come, first-served basis
Lunch Reception & Book Signing: 12-1:30 p.m.
Abstract
Market design is an ancient human activity but a relatively new part of economics. It seeks to understand how the design of markets and marketplaces influences their performance, to use this growing understanding to fix markets when they’re broken, and to help to establish markets where they are missing.
Many markets are matching markets, in which you can’t just choose what you want, even if you can afford it: you also have to be chosen. In these markets, prices don’t do all the work. For example, UCI doesn’t choose its new students by raising the tuition until just enough applications remain to fill the entering class; instead they set the price low enough so that lots of people apply, and then they choose from a big pool. (And UCI can’t just choose its students; it has to woo them in competition with other schools...) Other examples of matching markets are labor markets (workers can’t just choose where to work, nor can employers just choose who will work for them), school choice, and kidney exchange. I’ll illustrate with examples from these.
“Who Gets What? The New Economics of Matching and Market Design”
Date: Friday, June 7, 2019 at 1:30-2:30 p.m.
Location: UCI’s Calit2 Auditorium
Seating is on a first-come, first-served basis
Lunch Reception & Book Signing: 12-1:30 p.m.
Abstract
Market design is an ancient human activity but a relatively new part of economics. It seeks to understand how the design of markets and marketplaces influences their performance, to use this growing understanding to fix markets when they’re broken, and to help to establish markets where they are missing.
Many markets are matching markets, in which you can’t just choose what you want, even if you can afford it: you also have to be chosen. In these markets, prices don’t do all the work. For example, UCI doesn’t choose its new students by raising the tuition until just enough applications remain to fill the entering class; instead they set the price low enough so that lots of people apply, and then they choose from a big pool. (And UCI can’t just choose its students; it has to woo them in competition with other schools...) Other examples of matching markets are labor markets (workers can’t just choose where to work, nor can employers just choose who will work for them), school choice, and kidney exchange. I’ll illustrate with examples from these.